I am under the impression that is not the case, more than a few Taiwanese and Chinese fishing boats have been arrested in the past few years (and those are just onces I have heard). Taiwan has long asked for at least fishing rights negotiation that seem to have gone nowhere either.

It is of course, problematic as both Japan and China (and many other country as well) applies complete double standards for the various island disputes. if we look from an actual control POV, then Japan does control the islands, but the problem is that they don’t control two of their other disputed islands.

Historic perspective wise, if we’re going to take Japan’s administrative division prior to 1945 as a general rule of thumb, then the amusing thing is that they had divided pretty much all of the South China sea islands according to the current China / Taiwan claim … aka all of it belonged to Taiwan’s governing district. should we horse trade and give Japan 1 island for a whole sea then? since from that logic as Taiwan was given back to the ROC, then all the islands in the ROC’s governing district at that point belongs to the ROC…. which doesnt’ included Diayutai yes but it included all the Spartly isles.

Not saying it is. In many of these disputes, it’s your ancient map against mine. You can’t vote on it as many of these places are uninhabitable. The basis may be shoddy but it’s no worse than many other claimants’

Not sure this is a good basis for claims to bits of land. The UK has a claim to Ireland based on about 800 years of rule….

Indeed, I didn’t mean to imply that economic growth necessarily leads to diplomatic skirmishes. But it certainly sets the conditions for seemingly more “expansionist” policy choices on the part of China. With growing global interests come growing security concerns. As I alluded to earlier, a large country like China would find security reliance on the United States unpalatable. Furthermore, it’s even less likely that the US would have either the means or the will to accommodate a growing China’s security needs. Thus, with growing security concerns come bigger sticks and increased suspicions from the incumbent hegemon and regional stakeholders. Now, are economic growth and security dilemma destined for each other? No. But is there a complex mechanism triggered by economic rise that makes disputes more likely? Definitely.

All this is saying is that despite the rhetoric of “restoring the Chinese Nation’s glory,” developments in East Asia follow familiar patterns of the wax and wane of relative national strengths, rather than, as a priori assumptions would suggest, an aggressive grudge held by the CCP. Deft management of the situation requires better responses from all parties. And China isn’t the only one to blame. Of course, the pivot to Asia has the consent of the nations it involves; but it also involves China, who feels that its interests are being held hostage and isn’t terribly excited by this move. Even the most vociferously anti-China media acknowledge the South China Sea as a region embroiled in disputes, rather than as a united front against Chinese aggression. To view China’s claims to the various rocks and islands as but a first step to some grander territorial ambitions is an unwarranted leap of logic. After all, other states in the region have claims against China and against one another; but the US is already quietly taking sides. From China’s perspective, given Clinton’s targeted rhetoric in Africa (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/01/hillary-clinton-africa-china), the South Pacific (http://news.yahoo.com/clinton-south-pacific-china-focus-054737234.html), even Mongolia (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/world/asia/in-mongolia-clinton-offers-message-to-china.html), it’s not hard to guess where it stands in the South China Sea.

And are Chinese claims automatically illegitimate? Let’s take the Scarborough Shoal as an example, as it’s often seen as bullying against a much weaker state. First, claims from both sides are longstanding: China’s claim dates back to the 1930s (ROC) and the Philippines started oceanographic surveys around the area in the 1950s. Many would argue that China’s refusal to refer the case to UNCLOS tribunal reveals its claim is baseless. But this refusal is consistent with its position when it ratified UNCLOS in 1996. “The Government of the People’s Republic of China does not accept any of the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the Convention.” (http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China Upon ratification). Furthermore, even the Philippines removed the question of sovereignty from areas where the treaty would apply when it ratified the convention. “Such signing shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines over any territory over which it exercises sovereign authority, such as the Kalayaan Islands, and the waters appurtenant thereto.” In other words, neither country recognizes the authority of UNCLOS in this dispute. The fact of the matter is, even the standoff that took place in April was between Chinese surveillance vessels and a Philippine warship. One can argue that the reef is 127 miles from the Philippines and more than 400 miles removed from any Chinese landmass and therefore China’s claim is comical. Well, if we follow the same logic, then Diaoyu Island, being 120 miles off the coast of Taiwan and 200 miles removed from Japan, certainly doesn’t belong to the latter.

Billed as bolstering regional defense, the pivot has seemed to only fan the flames from a Chinese perspective. One needs to recognize that even states with regimes whose legitimacy is questioned have legitimate national interests.

But of course it’s always the other person’s fault coz they started it. I guess in my long rant, I was only imploring people to step back from caricaturizing a complex situation, and that instead of seeking justice in the wrong place, we should probably seek solutions.

I should apologize for missing your question in post 46 above. What I mean is that among the Asian-American community there are certain especially enchanting misconceptions due to the collective character of the community’s social and political existence. One is the misconception that the US has failed spectacularly in Asia, when in fact the US has pulled off one of the more remarkable acts of laconic diplomacy in history in a region with which it was insufficiently familiar, among states prone to revanchism and possessed of considerable animosity for each other. While the Asian-American community is aware of the on-going animosity, many lose sight of its (continually developing) sources and seriousness since their own limited political weight in the US requires them to put aside such issues and be more supportive of each other regardless of ethnicity. Thus, similarity of circumstance in the US prompts misleading emphasis on affliation and concourse in Asia, and statistics such as the number of Chinese loan words in Korean are speciously trotted out as proof of the two nations’ affinity while the ROK Marines’ service in Vietnam, the spread of Christianity in Korea, and current US cultural influence is either ignored or disparaged. Simultaneously, in accordance with the collective political character of the Asian-American community, one group’s grievances, both real and imagined, are often echoed by the others, reinforcing a more foundational misconception that the US just doesn’t, as it is sometimes colloquially put, “get Asia”. In essence, the political situation in which Asian-Americans find themselves striving for respect and embracing their distinctiveness is too often falsely projected onto an “Asia” that doesn’t adequately reflect their experience and is not cut from a single cloth.

I speculate that this is the source for t_co’s assertion that the US is “forever tainted” in Asia. While this may hold in a US-based echo chamber of grievance, it would appear the citizens of democratic countries in the Western Pacific would not concur.

Also, I wanted to discourage you from simply conflating China’s economic growth and foreign policy. The disputes it has with its neighbors are not “simply because China’s growing” and are not exclusively related to the economy; rather, they are a contingent constellation of military objectives, diplomatic missteps, and economic concerns.

Also, many is the time I’ve seen Chinese tangoing without a partner to peculiar music in a large regimented group in the park near my home. Make of that what you will.

“The ROC constitution probably still claims the whole of China . . . To characterize this as a pure unadulterated aggression is downright disingenuous.”

You know, if we’re going to discuss this, you need to do a lot better than ‘probably’. The ROC has abandoned the idea that unification can be acheived through military means, but the PRC has not – this is the difference.

“The reemphasized claims by the PRC is no less unreasonable than the US pivot to Asia.”

The US pivot is being carried out with the agreement of the countries which it involves, but no-one has consented to China’s claims in the South and East China seas. Intimating that force will be considered as a solution when in fact it is unlikely to be and would be disproportionate to any benefit acheived is unreasonable.

“I truly hope all sides can stop appealing to moralizing and victimhood.”

So do I.